International Conference

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA AREA:
TOWARDS A COOPERATIVE AGENDA

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
CONFERENCE REPORT

The Conference was organized by the Regional Stability in the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, in partnership with the Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University (Istanbul) and the Harvard University Black Sea Security Program, with the support of the International Relations Council of Turkey.

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BACKGROUND

Under 21st century circumstances, the character of international security is changing in fundamental ways. Traditional challenges to national integrity, including external military threats and ethnic separatism, have not disappeared. However, increasing global interdependence has expanded the relevance of new transnational challenges that increasingly will require coordinated international efforts if they are to be addressed effectively. Following the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area has moved from a stable border region to a focal point of European and international security, a central geopolitical area and point of cultural intersection between East and West. The region is home to several emerging regional powers with vested interests in promoting stability. As a source of and transit corridor for energy resources derived from the Caspian basin, as well as the locus for several volatile local conflicts with larger implications for global security, it has taken on a greater international profile as well. Recent years have witnessed new geopolitical realignments that have redesigned the security architecture in the region and led to the renaissance of engagement and rivalry by external powers. The region has also been plagued by the rise of transnational risks and threats stemming from instability and territorial conflicts as well as organized crime, drug and arms trafficking, migration, and environmental challenges. In view of these threats there is an urgent need to create new formats for cooperation capable of developing realistic solutions to regional problems and promoting a common regional security culture in the spirit of cooperative security.

The Regional Stability in the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the Partnership for Peace Consortium is committed to
assess the situation in the Greater Black Sea Area through enhanced international research and scientific cooperation, promote a better understanding of issues and developments within the area among the research and policy making communities, support the improvement of networks in the field of security policy and help to create a peaceful and stable context and active security community in the Greater Black Sea Area. The Group was officially launched in Bucharest on 1 February 2006 as a project-oriented initiative aiming at promoting common projects on topics of interests involving partners from the Black Sea countries. In the 2007-2010 timeframe, the Mobile Contact Teams Project was a successful practical effort to assist Partner Nations in implementing their IPAP/ANP and PARP Partnership Goals. Modular seminars in specific cluster areas of expertise were conducted both in multinational and national formats and were based upon demand-driven academic curricula focused on interactive activities.

In October 2010 the Senior Advisory Council (SAC) of the PfP Consortium provided new guidelines for the RSGBSA WG: to shift the focus from practical training and security cooperation projects to strategic research; to focus on regional policy recommendations targeting partner policy makers primarily; and to maintain a demand driven and inclusive approach through cooperation with other regional initiatives.

As its top priority for 2012, the Regional Stability within the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the PfP Consortium organized its first international research conference titled “New Security Challenges in the Greater Black Sea Area: Towards a Cooperative Agenda.” The conference was conducted in Istanbul, Turkey on 27-30 May 2012. The event was organized in close partnership with the Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University (Istanbul) and the Harvard University Black Sea Security Program, with the support of the International Relations Council of Turkey. The Conference was organized around four
main themes, including several keynote addresses and a final session that took an overarching look into the future. Each session was followed by vivid discussions ending with brief summaries by the moderators' of key points and conclusions. Intensive talks continued well beyond the panels, during the breakout sessions and evening interactions. In the last day of the Conference rapporteurs assigned to coordinate the breakout session outlined specific policy recommendations on each of the key focus areas. Appendix A provides a summary of the most important points raised during the speeches and throughout discussions.

Fifty-four Black Sea Area experts representing thirteen countries (see Appendix B) participated in the conference, including policy makers, military and security professionals, media representatives, and academics representing all countries of the Greater Black Sea Area as well as external actors. Presentations and discussions were organized around four critical new security challenges: energy security, critical infrastructure protection, transnational organized crime, and cyber security (Appendix C). All participants shared in the consensus that these and similar challenges are of critical importance in the Greater Black Sea Area; that only expanded regional cooperation will allow them to be mastered; that key external actors including the USA can make useful contributions in forwarding such cooperation; and that there is an urgent need to move toward a cooperative agenda by developing more effective institutionalized cooperative mechanisms.

Accomplishments of the Conference include: a comprehensive list of policy recommendations drafted by the co-chairs of the RSG-BSA WG on the basis of the suggestions made by the participating experts; increased awareness of common challenges in the region; and a strengthening of the willingness to enhance cooperation in
addressing and responding to the most pressing problems. The final goal of the RSGBSA WG has been to translate the findings of the Conference into operational plans capable of leading toward enhanced regional stability through more extensive security cooperation.
REPORT ON POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS EMERGING FROM THE CONFERENCE

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- Addressing new security challenges will include a partial displacement of the center of gravity of security affairs, from formal state structures to international networks, representatives of the private sector, and NGOs. The relevance of such organizations should be recognized and their potential leveraged in search of cooperative solutions.

- The unresolved conflicts involving Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh are major barriers to more effective regional coordination and cooperation. The status quo is not acceptable. There is an urgent need for intensified international efforts to find compromise solutions. The USA, Russian Federation, and EU should play leading roles in this effort, marshaling soft power resources to promote compromise and reconciliation.

- Security in the Greater Black Sea Area is first of all the responsibility of regional actors. However NATO (which includes all regional states as members or partners) has an important role to play as a source of expertise, promoter of military professionalism and reform, and security partner. These assets should be cultivated. The Regional Stability in the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group can play an important role in this regard as a catalyst for dialogue and security cooperation.

- There is a need to raise awareness of the increased importance of new security threats through education and transparency, paralleled by the creation of cooperative institutional mechanisms capable of addressing these threats in
practical terms. Acknowledgement of new challenges must be matched by practical measures to manage them. The curricula of regional defense academies should be expanded to include consideration of such threats.

- Only dialogue and cooperation can bring Black Sea countries together to shape the future, and there is an objective need for more robust and relevant regional security institutions. As the most significant regional powers, Turkey and Russia have a special responsibility to contribute to the emergence of such institutions by committing to work cooperatively in a multilateral context.

- There is a democratic deficit in much of the Greater Black Sea Area that presents a barrier to regional coordination and development. It is important that the momentum of democratic transformation and modernization be maintained despite the challenges of economic downturns and unresolved regional conflicts. Civil society initiatives indigenous to the region should be encouraged while international initiatives in the area of democracy promotion are sustained.

- Business relations in the region are dynamic, but often constrained by restrictive state policies. The region needs to facilitate cross border transportation and encourage functional interaction as a basis for expanded political cooperation.

- Black Sea regionalism is not progressing and major regional actors lack a comprehensive vision for regional development. The result is a revival of geostrategic rivalry among major players that does not serve the interests of the Black Sea area as a whole. The goal of a comprehensive regional security system should be revived as an alternative to the rise of national exceptionalism and a competitive Realpolitik that is not attuned to the nature of emerging security challenges. Expanding the competencies of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation can contribute to this effort.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Energy Security

- Cooperative approaches to the challenge of energy security should be cultivated. This could include discussions of energy security at the regional level, sharing of information and experiences, encouragement for public-private partnerships and dialogue, joint training and exercise, and measures to promote the harmonization of national legislation on energy security issues.

- To the extent possible issues relating to exploitation, access, and transit of energy should be resolved by market mechanisms based on transparency and respect for rules of the game, avoiding geopolitical competition and divisive zero-sum outcomes. Regional states and their European and Asian partners should develop and commit to respecting common legal standards and market regulations;

- There is a need to reevaluate Ukraine’s role as a transit and gas producer—the EU should re-activate its assistance in modernizing the Ukrainian system.

- The USA should retain the office of the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Security.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

- The countries of the Black Sea region need to promote broader public-private security cooperation to protect critical infrastructure, including raising public awareness, risk analysis, crisis prevention measures, a practical security strategy, and provisions for post-crisis stabilization and consequence management. Comprehensive measures are beyond the means of most regional actors. It will therefore be important to identify the most essential critical assets and infrastructure as first priorities (energy and electrical grids, pipelines, seismic threats).
- Partnerships between public authorities and infrastructure operators—which can be public or private actors—are needed in each of the GBSA countries.

- Information and experience exchanges should focus on national strategies and policies for critical infrastructure protection, standards for defining and protecting critical energy and related infrastructures, risks assessments, lessons learned, and early warning.

- The GBSA countries should:
  
  • Plan and conduct multilateral education and training exercises aimed at preventing attacks against critical energy and related infrastructure.
  
  • Conduct joint contingency planning to minimize the potential effects of the disruption or destruction of critical energy-related infrastructure.
  
  • Co-ordinate science & technology programs for energy infrastructure security with a view to maximize synergies and minimize duplications.
  
  • Develop critical infrastructure capabilities in a transparent and complementary manner.
  
  • Create a network of NGOs and Education Centers to be involved in critical infrastructure protection activities.
  
  • Multiply synergies and avoid duplications and capability gaps in times of economic crisis by pooling and sharing their scarce critical infrastructure protection capabilities, including aerial and sea surveillance, transport and SAR, MEDEVAC helicopters, and CBRN detection and monitoring systems.
• Involve private companies in relevant dialogue, coordination, and cooperation on the basis of the principle “need to share.”

• Reduce vulnerability to disasters by developing comprehensive and coordinated approaches to early recovery and consequence management in the aftermath of disasters affecting their critical infrastructures.

Cyber security
- In view of the increasing salience of cyber security threats, the countries of the region need to develop regional measures to address the problem. These should include raising public awareness, definitions of basic concepts concerning cyber threats, developing human capital by enhancing the knowledge and technical skills of those involved in management, and building mechanisms allowing for exchanges of information, awareness and best practices. The NATO Strategy for Cyber Security may serve as a model in this regard.

- A common terminology and set of definitions should be developed between parties addressing the challenge of cyber security to facilitate understanding and joint action.

- Cyber security involves challenges on the global, interstate, and individual levels. On the individual level, measures to improve Internet and Information Technology literacy are required, including enhanced educational programs in the schools.

- Cyber exercises need to be developed and executed addressing all critical infrastructures including public agencies.

- Agreements on how incidents of various kinds will be handled should be put in place. This is a process that must include
non-state actors. A voluntary and non-coercive environment based on consensus and practical cooperation should be created.

- The GBSA countries should establish common technical standards that prevent the manipulation of information technology for unilateral gain.

- Open structure for the exchange of views that provide opportunities for all stakeholders to express their concerns should be created.

- A mechanism for monitoring actions and initiatives that can adversely impact individual privacy and autonomy is required. A balance must be sustained between freedom and security.

**Transnational Organized Crime**

- Transnational Organized Crime has become increasingly flexible, networked, and coordinated. The convergence of crime, insurgency, and terrorism, especially as terrorists turn to crime to finance their efforts, makes it a specific national security threat. A comprehensive approach to combating organized crime involving political, military, policing, economic, and diplomatic means will be most effective. The Black Sea region needs to draw lessons from successful efforts elsewhere to develop such a comprehensive approach. The problem of drug trafficking is of particular salience, and can only be addressed by cooperative initiatives including expanded regional police coordination.

- A comprehensive approach to combating organized crime involving political, military, policing, economic, and diplomatic means will be most effective.

- Regional cooperation should be pursued in a complementa-
ry manner, avoiding duplication on the national level. However, executive competency should remain with the sovereign state.

- Public awareness of the terrorism-organized crime connection should be enhanced.

- International cooperation should facilitate and expand inter-agency cooperation between police, customs, border service, organized crime departments, counter-terrorism departments, narcotic divisions, and other relevant agencies.

- Stronger law enforcement is essential. The Black Sea region lacks a single, unified body capable of coordinating this effort. The creation of an international network to deal efficiently with immigration services (including international police cooperation and the role of INTERPOL) should be encouraged.
I. Opening of the Conference

The Conference was opened with welcoming addresses by Dr. Mustafa Aydin, Rector of Kadir Has University and President of the Council of Foreign Relations of Turkey, and Dr. Raphael Perl, Executive Director of the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

Both speakers stressed the relevance of the conference theme and raised expectations that the exchange of knowledge, information and experience from different countries would result in a better understanding of the major risks and challenges within the Black Sea region and an increased awareness of viable responses requiring coordinated international efforts. It was underlined that there is an urgent need to move toward a cooperative agenda by developing more effective institutionalized cooperative mechanisms. The Regional Stability in the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group can play an important role in this regard as a catalyst for dialogue and security cooperation.
II. Keynote addresses

Keynote addresses speaking to the overarching theme of *Framing the Issues – Turkish, Russian and American Perspectives* were delivered by **H.E. Ambassador Ahmet Bülent Meriç** (Director General for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey); **David Sobyra** (Director for Global Threats, Office of the Secretary of Defense, USA), and **Dmitry Balakin** (Head, NATO Section/Department of All-European Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation).

At the start of his speech, **H.E. Ahmet Bülent Meriç** laid out the main features that define the Black Sea region in the overall strategic setting. Ambassador Meriç noted that since antiquity the Black Sea has been a strategic geopolitical crossroads where varied ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities intersect. The nations of the region can play the role of catalyst in harmonizing and unifying the region. The Turkish high official distinguished between two distinct Black Sea areas: the Black Sea maritime area, consisting of six riparian states, and the Wider Black Sea area including the Balkans, South Caucasus, and Central and South East Europe. The larger region has a growing strategic importance.

Ambassador Meriç identified the protracted conflicts, rivalry over energy supply routes and markets, energy infrastructure protection, organized crime and trafficking, environmental risks, and the fault lines between Islamic and Christian worlds as the most sensitive issues impacting upon regional stability.

Only dialogue and cooperation can bring Black Sea countries together to shape the future. Ambassador Meriç acknowledged the role played by his country to that end by enumerating the regional security formats promoted by Turkey, including the BlackSeaFor, BSEC, and Black Sea Harmony. A special responsibility assumed
by Turkey aims at protecting and securing the Turkish straits. It was emphasized that Turkey does not oppose EU or NATO interests in the region. Indeed, Turkey’s integration into EU will make a valuable contribution to stability and prosperity in the region.

H.E. Meriç concluded by observing that despite the emerging risks and challenges confronting the region, local threat perceptions are minimal. The security of the Black Sea maritime area is first of all the responsibility of littoral states.

The following speaker was Mr. David Sobyra who focused his remarks on transnational organized crime (TOC). Mr. Sobyra posed the questions: What lessons have we learned in the fight against organized crime; what kinds of threats does the convergence of crime, terrorism and insurgency pose; and how can state policies help to address these threats?

Seeking to find answers, the speaker began by stressing the fact that narcotics trafficking is one major component of the broader challenge of TOC. The character of TOC changes in three ways: 1) organizational diversity and ability to spread its actions in various areas; 2) new methods of doing business- penetrating larger global marketplace, international companies and markets; 3) the change of structure of criminal groups—from hierarchies to networks, more flexible and agile. According to the US Strategy on Combating Transnational Organized Crime approved by President Obama in July 2011, organized crime is defined as a national security threat demanding interagency cooperation and a comprehensive platform of actions to fight against it. To this end, the American official emphasized the need to find innovative approaches and efficient capabilities that are cost effective and result-oriented. The convergence of crime, terrorism and insurgency represents a global threat while the Black Sea region is a major “target” that requires firm and coherent policies to counter it.
Mr. Dmitry Balakin stressed that the Black Sea region is an area where diverse cultures, religions and historical narratives are closely intertwined. Such diversity should provide an unprecedented ground for positive cooperation. Given the region’s strategic situation as a bridge between Europe and Asia it has a vast potential for development. He acknowledged the importance of cooperative regional efforts in promoting prosperity and security for the peoples of the Black Sea Region, and furthering the economic and social development of regional countries. This approach requires a coordinated effort and full commitment on the part of all regional actors.

From Russia’s perspective, all regional countries are important partners with whom Russia seeks mutually rewarding interaction. The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was singled out as a unique mechanism of mutually beneficial cooperation among the Black Sea countries. Mr. Balakin expressed support for regional projects in various fields with a special focus on those aimed at enhancing investment, modernization and economic prosperity, transport projects and improvement of infrastructure, emergency response to natural and man-made disasters, environmental protection, and scientific and technological cooperation. He underlined that significant opportunities for the expansion of regional cooperation exist in the field of energy. Unresolved tensions among regional countries represent an obstacle to expanded cooperation.

Global financial recession has resulted in an increase in social tensions, creating an environment for intensification of terrorist activities in different regions. The Black Sea area is not an exception. Given increased economic cooperation, there is an urgent need for more effective regional efforts to curb this transnational threat and increase cooperation within BSEC in critical infrastructure protec-
tion, including gas and oil pipelines, hydro-power, and maritime, air and railroad transport.

Combating terrorism will require comprehensive policies developed together with other international actors. Collaboration within the United Nations framework should play a central role in counter-terrorism activities. A wider dialogue involving bodies such as the BSEC, CIS, CSTO, and SCO is required to create a wider partnership network on counter-terrorism.

Another important area of regional cooperation is ensuring the security of the tourist sector, countering terrorism and extremism during major economic, public and sport events such as the EuroCup-2012, the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014, and the FIFA World Cup in Russia in 2018.

The problem of illicit drug trafficking has become increasingly acute. The countries of the Black Sea region have become important transit routes for the movement of opiates to Eastern, Central and Western Europe. Together with the activities of transnational organized crime this trend represents a threat to peace and stability that should be addressed collectively.

Mr. Balakin stressed that making the Black Sea region an area of cooperation, security and prosperity is the responsibility of the states of the region. Existing threats should be tackled by regional efforts and on the basis of regional ownership. No external assistance is required. In addition to BSEC there are various regional mechanisms, including in the military field such as the BlackSeaFor and Black Sea Harmony, which function quite effectively.

Another important tool to assist Black Sea countries in implementing their responsibilities in the sphere of security are the Montreux Conventions, which stipulate the special legal status of the Black
sea. The Russian representative reiterated that all countries including non-regional countries should be in full compliance with this document.

As regards the US plans to expand the European segment of its global missile defense system by deploying elements of the system on the territory of some Black Sea countries (including Turkey and Romania), the Mr. Balakin underlined that such an initiative does not increase stability or enhance trust. Last June The entry of the US Navy cruiser Monterey into the Black Sea in June 2011 raised questions given the fact that it was equipped with the Aegis BMD system. He underlined the importance of ensuring joint development of the European missile defense architecture, which would be a true reflection of the strategic partnership proclaimed at the NATO-Russia Council Summit in Lisbon in 2010.

In conclusion, Mr. Balakin expressed confidence that the conference would contribute to the enhancement of security cooperation and trust among the participating countries.
III. Session 1: Energy Security

The goal of the panel was to discuss the current status of energy security in the Black Sea region and identify possible solutions and recommendations for the development of cooperation in this field. The panel was moderated by Christian Pibitz, Head of Security Management, Erste Group Bank AG, Austria.

The first presenter was Mr. Volkan Ediger, former Energy Advisor to the President of Turkey, Head of Energy Systems Engineering Department, Kadir Has University. He focused his presentation on the current stage of oil and gas supply by providing a general overview and addressing individual regional states as case studies. Mr. Ediger argued that various nations have aspirations to become crossroads, bridges, or transit hubs. All Black Sea riparian nations, with the exception of Russia, have a supply problem. The Bosphorus, the Kerch Straits, and the Danube all count as gateways to Europe. There are many pipelines crossing the region; the real key to ensured supply the key is to boost fossil fuel output. Here the GBSA, like the Caspian basin and the Balkans, has great potential as an energy producer, including oil and gas, methane hydrate, and reserves in large structures with associated gas plums.

Mr. Ediger provided a brief overview of each regional country’s energy potential and level of supply dependence. If Bulgaria depends on Russia for 95 percent of its oil and 85 percent of natural gas supplies, Romania is the 2nd oil regional exporter after Russia. Nevertheless, Romania is also facing a rapid decline in domestic production. Ukraine plays a central role in the field in energy security being the main transit route for Russian oil (22 percent) and gas (80 percent). Georgia is developing some joint exploration projects while Turkey is actively involved in a multitude of projects and initiatives aiming at increasing its profile in the energy sector. Russia, of course, is the key player due to its huge energy
resources, complex network of projects, and potential for opening new fields of exploration.

The speaker concluded by observing that although the premises of energy sector development in the Black Sea are encouraging, the energy landscape might be subject to changes and unexpected disputes could arise. Regional stability is a key variable. The main question in the political equation is: *Pontus Axeinus* or *Pontus Euxeinus*?

The panel continued with the address of **Mr. John Roberts** from Platts, United Kingdom, who focused on the effects that turmoil in the Middle East might have on energy security and relations between the main energy players. Professor Roberts underlined that a major consequence of the Arab Spring will be the way in which the new governments manage energy policies. He suggested that most states are likely to focus on using energy resources for the domestic needs. As a result, less will be exported. Such an outcome will lead to reduced cash for energy investment, higher oil prices, reduced prospects for global growth, and recession. With Saudi Arabia’s domestic consumption increasing by 7 percent per year, its ability to continue to play the role of stabilizer will be called into question. Saudi authorities seek a price level at approximately $100 per barrel, but this may be unachievable. Mr. Roberts warned that oil at $150 per barrel might lead to a severe long-term recession. The Persian Gulf is a key area in global energy security strategy. This region is connected to the Black Sea, but is considerably more important than the Black Sea region as such. The transit of energy resources through the Bosporus is at about 50 percent of the level that transits the Strait of Hormuz.

Mr. Roberts raised important questions regarding the main producers and exporters in the Middle East. He stressed that natural gas, not oil, is the key issue. Russia, Turkmenistan, and Qatar are the only real natural gas exporters and therefore they should be
treated “with special consideration.” Iran is a net importer. The Middle East crisis does not affect the basic problem of the role of Russia, China, and Central Asia in the natural gas trade. The speaker stressed that in case of a drop off in Middle East energy supply the result will be a zero sum game for market share between Russia/Turkmenistan. Caspian natural gas is theoretically available, but Kazakhs are not interested in aggressive export. They will supply what is contracted by Russia. Transfers to China will be reduced. Azerbaijan will come on stream and “head West.” For Azerbaijan, the overriding issue remains unchanged—balancing a desire to increase its energy trade with Europe without antagonizing Russia.

Turkmenistan’s problem is that it only seeks contracts for large volumes of exports to Europe. In this case its reliance on sales to, or transit through, Iran remains a significant element in its energy relations. For Kazakhstan, turmoil in the Middle East is a good reason to work to ensure that Central Asia will not go through similar experience. That means working not only to promote good relations with both Russia and China, but good relations between Russia and China.

Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan do not agree on the basic terms of market development. Natural gas flows from the Caspian to Europe, but Europe is, in fact, a “frozen” market with reduced growth perspectives (according to Russia’s perspective). Europe does not know how much gas Russia will produce. The South Stream project might not make sense from a European consumer perspective, but that is irrelevant as long as it is viewed as a valuable and profitable initiative from the Russian perspective. The speaker estimated that construction of the South Stream pipeline should begin by the end of the year. A Trans-Anatolian pipeline carrying Azeri gas to Europe will also be constructed, but is unlikely to be extended to Central Europe or Italy. Gazprom no longer considers Europe as its primary gas market, although it will honor existing and future contracts. Russia will instead expand its liquefied natural gas pro-
duction and seek new markets in Asia. A core issue confronting Russia regards the impact of increased reliance on market forces in pricing gas.

The next speaker was Mr. Vladimir Evseev, Director of the Public Policy Research Center and Senior Fellow of IMEMO (Institute for World Economy and International Relations) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He underlined that the GBSA countries have common interests, especially in the sphere of economy and security, and also share common historical and cultural traditions. The region remains relatively stable despite multiple pressures. The speaker observed that in recent years the influence of Turkey and Romania, both of whom are seeking new sources of energy, has grown greater. They focus on developing new oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian region. Turkey is the most active in developing pipeline projects including Nabucco, South Stream, and others. In the future Turkey could assume a leading position in supplying European countries and will have a significant impact on the energy security of the Black Sea region. Russia (Gazprom) plans to start the construction of South Stream natural gas pipeline in December 2012. The pipeline will be pass under the Black Sea and on to South and Central Europe. All necessary arrangements have been made and all agreements have been signed. In accordance with this agreement the Russian energy company „Gazprom” will hold a 50 percent share in the project, the Italian company 20 percent, and the German company “Wintershall Holding GmbH” and the French company “EDF” 15 percent each. Russia will begin supplying natural gas through this pipeline in late 2015. The speaker also demonstrated that the natural gas transport systems of Moldova and Romania have been constantly improved with the financial support and assistance of the European Union.

Changing the role of individual Black Sea countries raises the question of the importance of multilateral cooperation within the format of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). In this re-
spect, Russia, Turkey and Romania are acting to promote national development projects in the Black Sea shelf. Each of the states located in the region is also attempting to develop alternative energy sources.

Mr. Evseev proposed that nuclear power creates certain opportunities in the area of energy security; it produces no greenhouse gases and consumes no oxygen. Ukraine is the leader in this area—nuclear power accounts for 48 percent of its energy consumption. Prior to the major accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant „Fukushima-1” the Russian government planned to increase the production of electricity at nuclear power plants in its European regions by 40-50 percent. The Russian-Turkish consortium led by the Russian company „Atomstroyexport” plans to build the country’s first nuclear power plant „Akkuyu” on the southern coast of Turkey. This project, valued at over $ 20 billion, is planned for 2013, with the first power reactor is expected to be on line by 2018. The life cycle of the plant will be 60 years. This is an area where the Russia-Turkish cooperation is expected to continue to expand.

According to Mr. Evseev there are various ways of ensuring energy security in the Greater Black Sea Area, including the possibility of the large-scale exploitation of hydrocarbon resources located on the Black Sea shelf. However, he pointed out that in the short to medium term there is no alternative to nuclear power. This area should receive special attention, especially given Russia’s readiness to provide assistance.

The first discussant was Mr. Valerii Chalyi, Deputy Director General of the Razumkov Center, Ukraine. He observed that all of the speakers addressed the case of Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine is a key energy player. It has unique underground natural gas storage potential. It is also the largest natural gas market for Russia and a net exporter of electricity. The challenge that Ukraine is facing with regard to its relationship with Russia is also a European issue.
Ukraine’s “natural gas crisis” is a common European challenge. By promoting transparency and common rules in energy markets Ukraine will move closer to Europe and will be more integrated with internal European markets. Mr. Chalyi warned that there is a growing risk of militarization and increasing tensions in the region and suggested that the leading countries of the region (Russia, Turkey) must beware of these developments. He also emphasized that many projects in the region are politically motivated and that they might provide additional sources of instability.

Mr. Chalyi expressed doubts that the South Stream undertaking will become a reality. He noted that it is a very expensive project, overly ambitious, and politically motivated. The implementation of such a project will not threaten Ukraine’s energy role but the effects on Europe will be severe and dependency on Russian energy supplies will increase. Therefore, cooperation between Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine in the Black Sea shelf should expand. The possibility of a conflict situation developing should not be excluded and such risks should not be underestimated. Mr. Chalyi also emphasized the importance of reducing dependency on Russian natural gas supply. He recommended respect for agreed upon rules of the game, broader access to internal markets, common rules and implementation procedures, a more active EU policy in the area, and more openness and transparency in Russia’s policy.

**Mr. Vladimir Socor**, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation (Washington, USA), discussed the current stage and future perspectives in the field of energy security. He focused on the transportation of Caspian basin energy resources to Europe via the Black Sea region. Mr. Socor observed that promoting energy security goals should focus on delivering non-Russian products through non-Russian transit routes to European markets.

The Nabucco pipeline project is no longer seen as viable or affordable in its originally-proposed form, but is being re-configured for
a new role as Nabucco-West, linked to the Trans-Anatolia pipeline project (TANAP). A game-changing initiative, the Trans-Anatolia project, initiated and planned by Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company, is the new centerpiece of the EU-planned Southern Corridor to Europe.

As regards Turkey, the discussant emphasized that there is its legitimate national ambition to become an energy transit corridor to Europe (transit does not mean „hub” in the case of natural gas). The Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Trans-Anatolia gas project in combination enable Turkey to achieve that ambition. Other countries (Russia, Iran) would not or could not advance this Turkish goal. Azerbaijan does.

Mr. Socor also warned that the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) would divert Azerbaijani gas to a peripheral market of limited potential, instead of Central Europe which needs both the additional volumes and the diversification to reduce dependence on Gazprom. Diverting those volumes to Italy would add nothing to European energy security overall, but would perpetuate Gazprom’s dominance over the Nabucco participant countries. TAP is a narrowly corporate business project, not a strategic project. Azerbaijan and Turkey clearly favor the Nabucco-West option because of its long-term strategic volume, access to Central Europe, and superior market potential.

As possible ways ahead, Mr. Socor pointed out the following: Firstly, the European Commission should not support the Trans-Adriatic pipeline, but rather Nabucco-West for its strategic value, consistent with the EU’s supply diversification goals; Second, Turkey should expedite the ratification of the Trans-Anatolia project agreements; Third, the United States and Turkey should join Azerbaijan and the EU in promoting a trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan, which could substantially increase transit volumes via Turkey to Europe.

In Azerbaijan, there seem to be two schools of thought about transiting gas from Turkmenistan to Europe: 1) transiting carefully
limited volumes, so as to avoid undermining the sale price for the aggregate gas volume; 2) transiting large volumes of Turkmen gas through Azerbaijan, so as to turn Azerbaijan into a major transit country to Europe, and raise European interests in the security and stability of Azerbaijan. He supports the second school of thought, which also fits in with Turkey’s interests.

Regarding the Gazprom-led South Stream, the discussant observed that this is not a genuine supply project, but a political project. Moscow has never identified new sources of gas or financing to supply South Stream. This project’s four political functions are: to pre-empt Nabucco; to keep Turkmenistan’s gas out of European markets; to threaten Ukraine with by-passing its transit system, unless Ukraine surrenders control of its transit system to Gazprom; and, through South Stream, to establish joint control of pipelines in European Union member countries. This latter goal violates the EU’s anti-monopoly legislation (Third Energy Package), which requires separation of gas supply from transportation on EU territory. Gazprom, on the contrary, seeks to maintain and expand that kind of vertically integrated arrangement.

Based on these reasons, Mr. Socor recommended to all EU member countries to follow the European Commission in supporting the Southern Corridor and avoiding involvement in South Stream. Bulgaria is a key element in this equation. South Stream’s section crossing the Black Sea from Russia is planned to land ashore in Bulgaria, then continue into several EU member and candidate countries. If Bulgaria adheres to the EU’s legislation and policy, it would seriously complicate Moscow’s plans.

The hard-pressed Ukraine needs special attention. The EU-Ukraine agreement, signed in 2009, envisaged modernizing Ukraine’s gas transit system with EU financing, conditional on gas sector reform in Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections and 2012 (upcoming) parliamentary elections have forced postpone-
ments of that reform. The EU should encourage Ukraine to resist surrendering to Gazprom ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections, and to return to the broad terms of the 2009 agreement (which has never been revoked) when the electoral cycle ends in 2012.

Concluding his intervention, Mr. Socor stressed that the EU-planned Southern Gas Corridor to Europe answers to major national interests of Black Sea countries. These countries (and the Western Balkan countries also) should not be negotiating separately and secretly with Gazprom about rival projects. Also, Mr. Socor cautioned that the U.S. State Department should not abolish the office of Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, which focuses on the Caspian basin and energy transportation westward. Plans to abolish this office (as part of departmental reshuffles in Washington) would be interpreted as a symptom of American disinterest and disengagement.
IV. Session II: Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical Infrastructure refers to material assets that are essential for the normal functioning of a society and economy. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is focused on minimizing potential vulnerabilities in these areas. The Conference’s second session, moderated by the Director of the Center for International and European Studies at Kadir Has University, Mr. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, addressed the critical infrastructure aspects of energy security as well as other areas of vital national concern including telecommunications, transportation, water supply, and hazardous materials.

Mr. Dmitriy Reznikov, Senior Researcher with the Institute of Mechanical Engineering Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, opened the session by stressing the relevance of the Traditional TVC (Threat/Vulnerability/Consequences) Model Applied for Security Risk Assessment. He also stressed the role of the law enforcement, intelligence and engineering communities, and various emergency agencies for adequate implementation. Specific features of terrorist threats and the requirements of applying the terrorist risk assessment models were explained. The Russian expert noted that terrorists have certain advantages in planning attacks. They can calculate rationally, select the most vulnerable and critical elements of critical infrastructure, choose the time and place of an attack, adapt to changes in safety procedures and defense strategies, learn lessons from previous attacks, and benefit from high levels of uncertainty. In terms of requirements, he pointed out that the decision nodes should be included in terrorist risk assessment models and that the models should be multisided and dynamic.

Three distinct types of terrorism were considered in Mr. Reznikov’s presentation: traditional terrorism, technological terrorism, and intelligent terrorism. Technological terrorism was defined as unauthorized impacts on critical infrastructure that allow breaking
through safety barriers, initiate secondary catastrophic processes, and inflict secondary damages and losses outside critical infrastructure boundaries. Intelligent terrorism is a purposeful unauthorized interference into the process of designing, building and/or operating critical infrastructure aimed at increasing existing vulnerabilities and creating new ones. Insider knowledge is used to trigger the most disastrous scenarios for terrorist attack. Intelligent terrorism implies, first of all, a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the critical infrastructure under attack, and identification of the most critical failure scenario. Also, it implies a comprehensive assessment of the scenario tree and “invention” of a scenario that could trigger cascading failures. Intelligent terrorism requires that a member of a terrorist group penetrates into the organization that designs, constructs and operates the critical infrastructure.

Mr. Reznikov concluded his intervention by noting that a multidisciplinary approach is needed in the field of CIP, illustrating his conclusion with reference to the famous parable of “the elephant and the blind men.”

The next panelist was the Executive President of the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management (EURISC) from Romania, Mr. Liviu Muresan. He recalled US efforts in the field of CIP starting with 1997, and also EU initiatives such as the EU Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). He argued that the basic concepts are under continuous transformation. For instance, the next generation infrastructure concept (NL) focused on the architecture, business models, and attributes of newly developed systems will signify a qualitative leap forward.

Among the main priorities for state and companies, Mr. Muresan listed the following: legal authorities and critical infrastructure management structures; an all hazards approach; interdependency and resilience studies; national strategies and legislation; criteria for evaluation and negotiations on the basis of the severity of
the disruption or destruction of the critical infrastructure (public, economic, environmental, political and psychological effects); an information sharing system; moving from physical security to cyber security measures (CIIP); and research, training and experience sharing. A holistic approach to security and innovation is of vital importance. The concept of “societal coherence” is equally important and should be strongly promoted by civil society representatives, with a major focus on societal security. The first priorities are and resilience, trust, raising awareness through education and training, and interoperability. All public-private partnership initiatives on the societal security sector should take into account the triangle of mutual dependency of technology, organizational dynamics and human limitations.

In the framework of the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, the Romanian expert called attention to the challenges that must be addressed in order to create a more secure Europe. These include fighting organized crime; resisting terrorism; opposing cybercrime; border security; and confronting natural and man-made disasters and the consequences of climate change.

“Swiss Army Knife” type products for states and companies were highly recommended. Mr. Muresan called attention to the smart energy security and critical infrastructure protection systems Energy Security War Room (ENSEWARO) and City Security War Room (CISEWARO) and outline their potential benefits. Finally, he presented EURISC contributions to the promotion of Critical Infrastructure Protection, as well as the aims of the Romanian Association for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Related Services (ARPIC).

The third speaker was the Head of the Department of International Relations from Kadir Has University, Mr. Mitat Çelikpala. He began by emphasizing the valuable role played by the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) located in An-
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kara, with a strong focus on its interests related to critical energy infrastructures. Critical Infrastructure was defined as “the assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the state that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economy, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.” Mr. Çelikpala stressed the fact that most critical infrastructure is owned by private companies, while responsibility almost always lies with the state. Public-private cooperation is a must, together with high tech safety systems and protection.

Attacks against critical infrastructure threaten to disrupt the functioning of government and business alike. They can produce cascading effects and catastrophic losses, including damage to the public. If such attacks included the use of WMD they would be absolutely devastating. The most visible threats to critical infrastructure which pose direct threats to human life and well-being were identified as conventional warfare, asymmetric threats, unconventional threats, and criminal threats among others.

Mr. Çelikpala’s presentation included a case study of a hypothetical attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Exposed pipelines are a special concern for Turkey. The attack on the BTC pipeline carried out on 5 August 2008 producing a financial loss of $1.7 billion. The extent of exposure is a primary reason why a cooperative agenda in the CIP field is mandatory.

The presentation concluded with some suggestions for enhancing protection, starting with the promotion of a broad understanding of public-private security cooperation. Investments in Horizon scanning, early warning, risk analysis, intelligence gathering and dissemination are vital, along with an accelerated development of security strategies. Special spotlights should be given to operations such as crisis prevention, crisis management, post-crisis stabilization and consequence management, and preparation (training and education, research and development, procurement, financing).
Discussion was opened by Mr. Todor Tagarev, Director of the Center for Security and Defense Management from Bulgaria. He emphasized that regional forums for critical infrastructure protection would come into play when the impact of disruption is felt in neighboring or other regional countries. While the terrorist threat to critical infrastructures is plausible, it is not the only reason for concern. Vulnerabilities to natural phenomena, mismanagement and accidents also form a significant group of risks.

The 2005 EU Green Paper on Critical Infrastructure lists eleven sectors at risk (water, food security, health, financial, public and legal order and safety, space and research, civil administration, information and communication technologies, transport, energy, chemical and nuclear industry). Taking this categorization as a basis of analysis, the energy sector seems to be of regional significance, while some of the remaining eleven sectors may be excluded from consideration. In this context and given the efforts EU and NATO are already making, Mr. Tagarev asked the audience whether there is sufficient willingness to move things forward within the Wider Black Sea area. In his view, increased willingness to act must be linked to a greater awareness of dependency on critical assets and infrastructures. He suggested that in order to transition from awareness to will to cooperate it is necessary to identify one or several key sectors or sub-sectors (e.g. electrical grids, pipelines) that can be realistically addressed, and to conduct a simple and realistic exercise in the Black Sea area.

V. Session III: Transnational Organized Crime

Transnational Organized Crime is a major security concern within the Black Sea region and elsewhere. It entails the illegal trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons under the auspices of transnational criminal organizations. Building viable strategies and national policies to diminish the threat from trafficking requires a
forward-looking approach and long-term commitment. The aims of the third session were to discuss current developments in the Black Sea region in the field of transnational organized crime and to identify possible cooperative strategies to address the challenges of criminal trafficking and border management in a constructive and sustainable matter.

The session consisted of three presentations and was moderated by **Mr. David Sobyra**, Director, Regional Counter-narcotics Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense.

**Mr. Oğuzhan Ömer Demir**, Assistant Professor, International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM), Turkish National Police Academy, opened the session by describing the continuing challenge of illegal immigration and smuggling that requires comprehensive policies to counter. He focused his presentation on Turkey as a particular case study. As regards illegal immigration, Mr. Demir emphasized that Turkey is used as a transit, target and source country. Turkey’s position is a very sensitive one as a natural bridge between East and West. It is used as a transit country for many nationals (Pakistani, Burmese, Iraqi), and as a target country for Somali, Afghani, Turkmen, Syrian, and Iranian nationals, but it is rarely a source for Turkish nationals with lower economic status.

The speaker also addressed the issue of smuggling, making use of statistics and evaluations that clearly revealed the magnitude of the phenomenon. He acknowledged that most smugglers are Turkish, but there are also other nationals involved in such activities (Arabs, Turkmen, and others). Basically, they transit Turkey in order to enter Greece, thereby gaining access to the EU. Mr. Demir used the categories of age, occupation, marital status, monthly income, and language in order to compile a general profile of the illegal immigrant smugglers. As regards the structure and organization of
these groups, he noted the average size of smuggling group is nine or ten members. Smugglers involved in management and planning are the best paid, while cadre involved in execution receive smaller shares. Migrant smuggling is a transnational phenomenon but it does not resemble a mafia-type operation, being essentially non-violent, based on looser networks with less rigid hierarchical structures, and with a greater division of labor.

Mr. Demir emphasized the links between migrant smuggling and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization. He stressed that the PKK is actively involved in such activities. Between 1995 and 2003 PKK actions were focused on transporting militants seeking asylum from Turkey into Europe. Currently, militants move in and out of Turkey with groups of illegal immigrants in tow. Many of them move from northern Iraq into European nations with the help of forged passports.

Why migrant smuggling? Mr. Demir identified several possible reasons. The gigantic web of people seeking greener pastures creates a huge pool of “ready to go” customers. Smuggling is often considered a legitimate occupation and enviable profession in border areas. Not least, individuals are attracted to the low demands on time and effort, high income, and hedonistic lifestyle often associated with this line of work.

The second speaker was Mr. Alexander Gridchin, Assistant Director, International Partnerships and Development Directorate, INTERPOL. He began by describing the priority crime areas addressed by INTERPOL namely: public safety and terrorism, drugs and criminal organizations, human trafficking, financial and high-tech crime, fugitive investigation support, and anti-corruption. As regards the International Partnership and Development Directorate, Mr. Gridchin explained that its mandate includes the responsibility to strengthen infrastructure and support mechanisms, deliver core services, and build governmental, institutional, and financial support for strategic priorities. The main activities developed by
the Directorate are global partnerships and external relations, revenue generation and partnerships and project development. The speaker developed activities associated with each area in detail, including goals, functions, and achievements.

Mr. Gridchin also spoke about the ongoing projects developed by the Directorate and gave some examples of private and public sector partnerships within the INTERPOL framework. His presentation also addressed the recent INTERPOL Travel Document Initiative. Criminals can often easily cross borders, while international law-enforcement officials cannot. The initiative seeks to identify possible solutions to this problem by facilitating international travel for INTERPOL officials, allowing rapid assistance to member countries, and providing a new international police cooperation tool. The Travel Document comes in two forms: e-Passport and e-Identification Card. Both comply with international standards (ICAO and ISO).

Finally, Mr. Gridchin emphasized that today INTERPOL is a different kind of organization than in the past, shaped as a globalized information/database system more capable of addressing the growing challenges of fighting crime in the 21st century.

Mr. Andrew Sullivan, from the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, offered an overview of recent developments in the field of transnational organized crime. He identified and discussed major emerging trends, including the rise of a criminal services industry, cooperation with terrorist groups, sovereign crime, and involvement of oligarchs and tycoons in organized crime. The speaker stressed that transnational organized crime is an extremely well organized industry generating revenues of over $2 trillion.

Mr. Sullivan observed that there is a dangerous tendency towards greater cooperation between transnational organized crime and terrorism. He pointed out that it is not a question of whether criminal and terrorist organizations are cooperating, but rather how
much. There is a clear growth in connections, but the two types of organizations are opportunistic “bed fellows rather than long-term partners.” Organized crime is not trying to overthrow the system, but rather to corrupt it.

How most effectively to fight organized crime? Especially promising tactics were characterized as sunlight and transparency; transnational law enforcement; use of the media to expose and “name and shame;” and increased expertise including expanded use of technology.

During the discussion period Ms. Nigar Góksel, Editor-in-Chief of the *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, addressed the audience. She suggested that there is an urgent need for Turkey to improve its capacity to address the needs of refugees, in order to come into compliance with EU standards and to reinforce its stature as a regional leader. She also warned that Turkey seems to be lagging in introducing integrated border management, and raised the question of whether this might be because of differences between state institutions over responsibility and authority sharing regarding border control. She mentioned the EU mechanisms for securing EU borders and noted that the Western Balkan countries have obtained the right for their citizens to travel visa-free to the Schengen zone. Turkey has not been offered such a prospect and Turkish citizens feel “left out” as a result. It would be in the EU’s best interest to offer visa free travel to Turkish nationals in return for Turkey supporting EU immigration control efforts. Without prospects for visa liberalization, Turkey has less incentive to promote a more coherent and supportive policy to curb illegal migration to the EU.

The second discussant was Mr. Sergei Konoplyov, Program Director of the Black Sea Security Program, Harvard University. He stressed that today criminal activity is by its very nature transnational, Our understanding of what constitutes transnational crime should include both criminal activity involving cross border
transactions and criminal activity that takes place in a single country but whose consequences significantly affect other countries. Examples of such crimes include human trafficking, smuggling or trafficking of goods (arms trafficking and drug trafficking), sex slavery, terrorism, torture, and apartheid. Globalization, propelled by advances in technology, has contributed to a rise in transnational crime. Criminals no longer recognize national borders. As a result our collective response to crime must also be organized across borders.

A major issue in the prevention of transnational crime is the failure of leaders to acknowledge that their own country may be a significant part of the problem. For example, in the United States many people feel that the violence in Mexico is Mexico’s problem and that all the U.S. needs to do is to build a fence to keep the violence and crime away from the U.S. Transnational organized crime involves the planning and execution of illicit business ventures by groups or networks of individuals working in more than one country. These criminal organizations use systematic violence and corruption to achieve their goals. Transnational crime ring activities weaken economies and financial systems and undermine democracy. These networks often prey on governments that are not powerful enough to oppose them, prospering on illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, that bring them immense profits.

The final commentator, Ms. Souad Mekhennet of the New York Times, stressed that the key issue is the link between transnational organized crime and terrorism. She acknowledged that there is a huge smuggling network in Turkey encouraged by the country’s strategic location in a transit zone. She also argued that it is increasingly difficult to identify terrorist groups and fight against them. Ms. Mekhennet discussed the example of the Arab Uprising and the way in which terrorist groups have adapted to it, maintaining an al-Qaida inspired ideology but changed their names and self-descriptions to make categorization more complicated. In Egypt, in order to hide their true identity, the main actors do not identify
themselves as al-Qaida or Taliban networks. It is very difficult to counter these groups if we do not know who and what they really are. The main challenge is accurately to identify the terrorist groups and to understand what they really want, then to develop comprehensive actions to counter them.
VI. Session IV: Cyber Security

The goal of the fourth session, moderated by the Co-Chair of the RSGBSA WG, Professor Craig Nation, was to identify and discuss cooperative measures to enhance the ability of actors in the GBSA to respond to evolving cyber-threats. Cyber Security is an area of growing concern in the region. It is widely recognized that broad international cooperation in this area is beneficial and of mutual interest. Countering the cyber threat requires a comprehensive strategy including intelligence sharing, defense planning, comprehensive policies and coherent mechanisms able to act in an efficient manner and build viable defense capabilities.

The first presenter was Mr. Salih Bicakci, Associate Professor of International Relations with Isik University, Turkey. He stressed the need for clear definitions of what we mean by cyber terrorism and cyber war. The 2008 cyber attacks against Georgia and the case of Estonia were mentioned as attacks that seemed to “come from everywhere.” They clearly posed the dilemma of assigning responsibility. Other relevant questions and issues include how the adversary can be defined, the need for diverse kinds of defense strategies, and the challenges of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. Professor Bicakci emphasized the role of cyber exercises and penetration tests, and the need to broaden them to include not only governmental stakeholders but also the private sector. As for response and recovery, it is important to update back up plans and envisage crisis management scenarios for each sector (including SCADA and critical infrastructure). A Cyber Defense Report containing Country Defense Rankings was briefly presented.

In conclusion, Professor Bicakci identified some ways for improvement looking forward. These included building trust between private and government stakeholders; increasing public awareness; information protection as a high priority; cyber confidence and
consensus within the framework of certain international agreements; and leveling the capabilities of regional countries for possible attacks.

The next presenter was Mr. Detlef Puhl, Senior Adviser with the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division. He presented the NATO Cyber Defense Policy and the cyber defense commitments made at the NATO Lisbon Summit that were reaffirmed in the Chicago Summit Declaration of May 2012. Three areas of activity pertaining to the current Cyber Defense Policy were briefly introduced: Protection of NATO’s Communication and Information Systems; protection of national communication and information systems critical for NATO core tasks; and cooperation with partners and international organizations.

Mr. Puhl developed the main steps made by NATO towards integrating cyber defense with collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security partnerships. Concerning the first core task of the Alliance, collective security, he pointed out the relevance of cyber defense for the operational and strategic aspects of NATO’s defense planning process and, as well as strategic intelligence sharing. Cyber issues have also been integrated into NATO’s Communication and Information System (CIS) to increase resilience and prevention, and Memorandums of Understanding have been concluded with individual member nations to manage cooperation with NATO. Crisis management, the second core task, takes up cyber issues with exercises, crises management manuals and procedures, tactical intelligence sharing, CEP procedures and expert pools, as well as lessons learned from various operations. Finally, for the third core task, existing partnership programs, joint projects and events now include cyber issues in a tailored approach according to the partner nation’s engagement with NATO and the values shared with like-minded partners. This includes NATO’s support to nations for building a National Cyber Defense Posture, starting with a consolidated national strategy, supporting laws and
structures, partnerships with the private sector and academia, international cooperation, and increased awareness.

Mr. Puhl concluded by saying that NATO’s new Cyber Defense Policy reflects a new “business model” for the Alliance, in which the military play a relatively reduced role and engagement with a wider range of different government agencies, non-governmental organizations, academia, and private business become a necessity.

The final presenter in this session was the Vice-Director of the Information Security Institute at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Mr. Alexey Salnikov. He described new challenges in the field, derived from the critical dependence of modern society upon information technology and the Global Information Network. The Russian expert identified cyber crimes, cyber terrorism, and the use of cyber systems as weapons for aggressive military purposes as major information security threats. Various national, international and regional initiatives were carefully detailed, followed by a summary of the UN Convention on International Information Security promulgated at the international conference concluded on 22 September 2011 in Yekaterinburg (Russian Federation). The Convention, it was argued, outlines comprehensive mechanisms for averting and resolving military conflict in the information space, preventing the use of the information space for terrorist purposes, and counteracting illegal activity in the information space.

Colonel Timothy A. Chafos, U.S. Army, Mr. Andriy Shevchenko, member of the Parliament of Ukraine, and Mr. Sean Costigan, lecturer with the New School University (US) served as discussants.

COL Chafos described the U.S. military approach to cyber security and emphasized the attention given by his country to the intelligence sector. He mentioned the need to develop cyber capabilities in the GBSA, and stressed the importance of human capital. Cyber confidence and the construction of efficient cooperation mechanisms were considered to be essential for the region. To this end,
lucid evaluations of the current state of affairs (particularly of human capital development), infrastructure, investments and coherent ways of action are required, ideally with assistance from NATO and the EU. Special attention should be given to intelligence sharing and education.

Mr. Shevchenko described the need to protect digital systems, including computers and networks, which are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Nuclear energy facilities use such systems to monitor plant processes, operate equipment, and store and retrieve information. The Ukrainian parliamentarian stressed the importance of the Internet, now used in Ukraine by more than 40 percent of the adult population.

Mr. Costigan addressed the issues of spoke about cyber criminality and terrorism, presenting a table with the estimated costs of major physical attacks, including the 9/11 events. He differentiated between “hacktivists,” “cybercriminals” (operating for profit), and “,”cyber warriors and noticed the rapid rise in social networks. In this context, he remarked that “if Facebook were a country, it would be the world’s 3rd largest.” Globally, users spend over six hours a day on social networking sites.
VII. Special Addresses

The second session was followed by a number of special addresses presented by distinguished invitees. Mr. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Secretary General of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), opened the session with a historical overview of the evolution of BSEC and a description of its most important contributions to fostering security and cooperation in the region.

Mr. Iulian Fota, Presidential Adviser and Head of the National Security Department, Romanian Presidency, presented a paper entitled Cooperation and Competition in the Black Sea: From the Post-Cold War Era to a Globalized World. The core objective was to assess the strategic importance of the Black Sea region and evaluate possible options to strengthen cooperation and ensure regional security.

Mr. Fota acknowledged that globalization is the key concept that shapes the current security environment and advances international and regional cooperation. He focused his analysis on cooperation and security in the Black Sea area, showing that this region was the focus of dramatic transformations that emerged following the geopolitical shifts marking the end of the Cold War era. The speaker identified three main stages of evolution in the Black Sea strategic posture. The first stage covers the years between 1991 and 2002 when the region reached a higher international profile as a result of increased integration, international recognition, and statehood. During the second stage, between 2002 and 2008, the Black Sea region reached its peak in terms of economic development, political stability and social transformation. NATO and EU enlargement grounded a period of growing stability and security in the Black Sea and provided the region new opportunities for playing a major geopolitical role. According to the presenter, this period might be defined as “strategic vacation.” The Georgian war of 2008 was a turning point—the “end of the vacation” and the
beginning of a period featured by increased security vulnerability, political unpredictability, and strategic realignments.

Mr. Fota went on to assess the outstanding assistance provided by NATO and the EU and their contributions to transformation of the region. However, he mentioned that there is no substitute for the role of the local stakeholders—regional actors must assume the main responsibility for managing regional affairs.

The GBSA remains an area of a high strategic relevance developed on two geopolitical axes: north/south and east/west. Mr. Fota addressed the role of Russia and Turkey as the main regional players as well as the main strategic priorities of the West towards the region. As regards the future of the Black Sea in the new international context, important trends include ongoing globalization, European tri-polarity, the Arab awakening, China’s increased interest in the region, and the political dynamics of the relationship between Russia, Turkey, and West.

Mr. Fota concluded his presentation by underlying that the future of the region depends on broad international cooperation stressing the need to build viable mechanisms and instruments for advancing regional cooperation and overcome existing security threats and challenges.

The next speaker was **H. E. Ambassador Feliks Stanevskiy**, Head of the Caucasus Department, Institute for CIS Countries, Russian Federation, who presented paper entitled *The Caucasus in Search of Peace*.

Ambassador Stanevskiy described the major political dynamics underway in the South Caucasus, including presidential elections in Abkhazia, Russia, and South Ossetia, and parliamentary elections in Abkhazia, Armenia, and Russia. Similar elections are scheduled in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The speaker speculated that these developments are not likely to open new prospects for the settlement of the longstanding conflicts in the region.
Ambassador Stanevskiy addressed the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict opposing Armenia and Azerbaijan. France, Russia, and the U.S. lead diplomatic negotiations as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. On the diplomatic level progress has been substantial, and the Madrid Principles, approved by both parties to the conflict, represent a remarkable success. Nevertheless every step forward faces vehement criticism public opinion on both sides, and to date this has been decisive. The way to normalization of the situation of the region must pass through increased international influence on public opinion within Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, the predominant role of public opinion is also evident in regard to efforts to resolve the Georgia – Abkhazia and Georgia – South Ossetia conflicts.

Ambassador Stanevskiy noted that in the case of Georgia a common approach on the part of the international community is missing. He observed that while the West is well informed on what Georgians think about Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it is not accurately informed about what motivates the aspiration of Abkhazians and Ossetians to be independent. There are two ways to move forward. The first is to try to re-incorporate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia. The second is to persuade Georgia to recognize their independence. The political strategies developed by the Georgian authorities aiming at re-integrating these territories will not succeed so long as both Abkhazia and Ossetia do not want to be part of the state of Georgia. Lasting peace is possible, but it will not be achieved by efforts to force the people of Abkhazia and Ossetia to give up at their independence.

In conclusion Ambassador Stanevskiy shared his deep concerns over the possible regional security impact of the unresolved conflicts, arguing that prospect for cooperation in the Black Sea area will be severely damaged if normal participation on the part of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not recognized.
The discussion allowed participants to share their views and opinions on the topics addressed during the presentations. It was underlined that there are serious obstacles to cooperation: regional diversity, lack of democratic institutions, unresolved conflicts with little progress towards resolution. The strategic shift of the U.S. towards Asia could also have unpredictable consequences for the region’s strategic architecture. The EU has been a key actor in the GBSA but it will not be able to devote much attention and energy in the future or to be a powerful international actor since its main focus will be on the unresolved economic crisis.
VIII. Special Session: Looking to the Future – Critical Issues in the Greater Black Sea Area

The conference concluded with a special session chaired by Major General (r) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu, Co-Chair of the Regional Security within the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the PfP Consortium. The main objective of the session was to present various national perspectives on the current status and future prospects of evolution of the Black Sea region.

The distinguished speakers who made presentations during the special session were Professor Mustafa Aydin, Rector of Kadir Has University and President of International Relations Council of Turkey, Professor F. Stephen Larrabee, Distinguished Chair in European Security, RAND Corporation, Washington D.C., Professor Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Director of the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University, and Professor Arkady Moshes, Head of the Russia Program, Finnish Institute of International Relations.

Professor Mustafa Aydin began his presentation by offering some insights concerning current developments in the Black Sea region. He stated that the process of institutionalization of the GBSA is underway and it will contribute to increasing cooperation, decreasing conflict, and improving economic development. He acknowledged that the main issue is not to create institutions but to make those that already exist function more effectively. This is by far a more difficult task—we must work to create conditions allowing multilateral organizations to do what they can and should do. The speaker observed that even BSEC does not function as well as it should because of the various constraints imposed by the member states. Despite the variety of institutions existing in the region, none of them could prevent the events of 8th of August 2008 (the Russian-Georgian war).
Professor Aydin offered several observations on future security perspectives for the region. First, one of the biggest problems is Russian distrust, and reticence to work within multilateral frameworks. He stressed that Moscow prefers bilateral relations to working within regional multilateral coordinating frameworks. But this reluctance hinders existing multilateral mechanisms from working properly. Second, conflicting visions regarding the future of the Black Sea divide major regional actors. The U.S. perspective differs from that of the EU, is totally different from Russia’s, and is not aligned with that of Turkey. As a result the potential for regional cooperation is hindered. The re-emergence of great power competition in the region should be noted. Third, the region continues to confront a democratic deficit. Despite rising expectations, the democratization process in the region as a whole has not advanced. Fourth, business cooperation on state-to-state level remains unsatisfactory. Here, various sources of conflict co-exist: state versus state threats, ethnic conflicts, and new security challenges (energy, cyber security, environmental concerns, etc.). Old and new style conflicts together create a unique security environment. Fifth, the region’s “frozen” conflicts remain unresolved. Turkey does not know how to deal with the non-recognized entities in the Caucasus, and the situation is made more complicated due to the presence of large communities with origins in the Caucasus region living inside Turkey.

Professor Aydin addressed the issue of the role of civil society and the business community. He underlined that civil societies are underperforming in their societal roles—in effect there is no genuine civil society in the GBSA. Controlled by the governments, funded mostly from external resources, NGOs have become a sort of business. The business community is dynamic but it should be further encouraged. A solution might be to open borders and facilitate border crossing.

In conclusion Professor Aydin suggested that the key problem for the future of the region is the unresolved conflicts. Those involved
must work to find a solution to issues that affects all the peoples of the Black Sea region.

Professor Stephen Larrabee provided some thoughts on how the region might look like in five to ten years. Emphasizing that the region requires more cooperation and coordination, he outlined the main obstacles standing in the way, including:

1. **Regional Diversity**, including widely separated levels of economic and political development that makes cooperation difficult. In the GBSA regional over-institutionalization is linked to under performance.

2. **The Democratic Deficit**.

3. **The Unresolved or Frozen Conflicts**.

4. **The U.S. Pivot towards Asia**, which will not mean “forgetting” Europe and the Black Sea, but will shift priorities towards Asia. From the late 1990s, the U.S. expressed heightened interest toward the Black Sea region but did not develop a regional policy *per se*, preferring to emphasis bilateral policies. During the Clinton presidency there was an effort to promote a more coherent approach to the Black Sea involving democracy promotion, energy security, and hard security but with few practical results. The case of Libya is revealing, demonstrating a U.S. tendency to step back and look to the EU allies to do more.

5. **The EU’s Weakness**, manifested by the ongoing economic crisis. Over the past ten years the EU was a major factor in the Black Sea but will likely not be able to play that same role in the future. The main focus will shift towards debt crisis, consuming energy and resources.

6. **The Loss of Momentum for NATO Enlargement**, which in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War is on hold indefinitely. NATO confronts a lack of consensus regarding op-
opportunities for future enlargement in the post-Soviet space. It is worth mentioning current developments in Ukraine, which has withdrawn its NATO candidacy. Moreover, only 20-25 percent of Ukrainians still support NATO membership and this is a warning call regarding future prospects for integration in the region.

7. *An Increase in Russia’s Interest in the GBSA.* This is in contrast to trends in U.S. policy. The GBSA is likely to be an important priority for President Putin. The Russo-Georgian War was not intended by Russia as the first salvo in a new cold war. It was a defensive reaction intended to shore up Russian influence and hegemony in a region considered to be of high importance. The inability to protect Georgia demonstrated the limits of US power in the region. Professor Larrabee raised the issue of American-Russian reset and its future perspectives. He claimed that the reset never really happened and is unlikely to be continued by the next U.S. Administration. Putin must govern a different kind of Russia where a more restive and assertive middle class will put growing pressures on the government. This will impact on U.S.-Russian relations since human rights and democracy promotion have become major issues. Missile defense is another factor that can complicate Russian-American dialogue. The future of U.S.-Russian relations is likely to resemble a cold peace.

8. *Turkey’s Changing Role in the Region.* Can Turkey continue to play a dynamic role? Political dynamics inside Turkey might dramatically change in case that the Prime Minister Erdoğan is forced to withdraw from political life due to illness. In such a scenario, the AKP will be severely weakened and could split. In this case strong leadership will be difficult to reconstitute. The AKP is Erdoğan’s party and it depends on his personal leadership. The Kurdish issue remains a major reason of concern for the Turkish government. Despite
some democratic openings, there is little indication that the government is really ready to address the Kurdish issue in a serious way. These internal problems might restrain Turkey’s opportunities to play a larger regional role.

Mr. Larrabee ended with a pessimistic conclusion, stating that security prospects in the GBSA are not encouraging. New security challenges require more multilateral cooperation, but it will be more difficult to achieve given the current political dynamics that constrain the role of major regional actors.

Professor Dimitrios Triantaphyllou acknowledged that the GBSA is a region in flux and in trouble. He stated that the region is currently facing changing political alignments and noted that there is a tendency on the part of some countries to promote national exceptionalism. It remains difficult to arrive at a consensual definition of what the region is. Can we, and should we consider the GBSA as a distinct unit of analysis?

The speaker moved on to the role played by various institutions and international organizations. BSEC has unfortunately failed to achieve its goals. The EU entered the game a bit later but beginning in 2003-2004 launched a number of major initiatives, including the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Black Sea Synergy, Eastern Partnership, and 2010 Danube policy. In response to the Arab Spring, a new focus on addressing the southern neighborhood has emerged and in May 2012 the European Commission report on a new ENP was released. However, the presenter identified some possible obstacles that might weaken the EU’s involvement in the region: the financial crisis; the lack of strategic vision or guidance among leaders; difficulties in implementing of Lisbon Treaty; and a growing tendency on the part of member states to impose their own national agendas. The EU seems increasingly unable to achieve what it is trying to promote: values, stability, and growth.
Professor Triantaphyllou argued that the EU lacks a strategic blueprint and this makes the region vulnerable to geopolitical rivalry among other regional stakeholders such as Russia and Turkey. These actors have conflicting agendas on many sensitive issues: missile defense, Syria, and energy security among them. But both are interested in maintaining a strong footprint in the region based on a status quo orientation that is different than the transformative vision of the EU. As regards economic prospects, the speaker stated that Russia’s WTO membership is likely to enhance business cooperation with Turkey. In 2012, four million Russian tourists are expected to come to Turkey due to the new procedures that facilitate the issuance of visas.

Professor Triantaphyllou questioned whether there is a real potential for creating a functional cooperative security system in the region. This is a key objective, but is it achievable? Is cooperative security viable in the GBSA or are we returning to an era of power politics? His recommendation: focus on regionalism at the national, regional and local levels and invite governments to promote regional approaches to security in order to prevent the rise of Realpolitik in the region.

Professor Arkady Moshes shared his views on two major regional issues with unpredictable spill over effects.

A first area of concern is the future of Ukraine. Professor Moshes underlined that Ukraine is approaching a threshold—a situation where it will no longer be able to perform the balancing act between Russia and West that has managed for the past twenty years. There is a huge risk that Ukraine will end up “between the two chairs” where relations with Russia are not improving while relations with the West are worsening. Relations between Russia and Ukraine remain complicated and there are many unsolved and challenging issues: energy supply, the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the role of the Russian language in Ukraine among them. The speaker also
addressed prospects for bilateral economic relations. Ukraine’s key card (natural gas transportation lines) has been weakened by the construction of the North Stream pipeline, a situation that might worsen with the additional construction of a North Stream 3 or 4. The South Stream project further complicates the overall economic picture. Is a substantial loss of Ukrainian sovereignty due to Russian inroads possible or likely? This is unlikely, but attempts to move in that direction are likely creating new tensions and troubles between the two countries. As regards the Western dimension, the presenter noted a growing feeling of dissatisfaction in the West towards Ukraine, which is perceived to have lost its geostrategic importance. The reasons are twofold: firstly, Ukraine is drifting away from the democratic standards embodied in the promise of the Orange Revolution, and secondly, the West is less afraid of Russian geopolitical ambitions than it once was. Ukraine needs support. It is too small to be an independent player and could eventually end up as “sick man of Europe.”

A second area of concern is future of Russia. The speaker asserted that there is no way to go back to the Putin “era of stability” from 2000-2008. Nowadays, the Russian economy is facing major problems, the economic situation is uncertain, and an industrial recession is approaching. There is a general consensus that the country needs structural reforms. The political realities are also troubling. The Putin leadership is eroding and the protest sentiment is spreading. Professor Moshes suggested that Putin no longer represents the entire nation. Given these troubling challenges, what kind of foreign policy can this country afford? Pushing forward with an anti-Western policy is not the appropriate solution. Russian foreign policy will be assertive, despite its weaknesses, but not necessarily effective. An accurate long-term forecast concerning Russia’s future policy is not possible, but significant changes are expected to occur. We should be prepared for future challenges.
APPENDIX A: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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APPENDIX B: CONFERENCE AGENDA

Agenda

New Security Challenges in the Greater Black Sea Area:
Towards a Cooperative Agenda

Sunday, 27 May 2012

Arrival of Participants
Transport to Hotel Ceylan InterContinental, Istanbul
19:00 – 21:00 Icebreaker reception at the Hotel – “Citronelle” Room

Monday, 28 May 2012

08:45 Transport to Kadir Has University
09:30 – 10:00 Opening Remarks

- **Mustafa Aydin**, Rector, Kadir Has University; President, International Relations Council of Turkey


10:00 – 11:00 Keynote Addresses – Framing the issues – A policy perspective

- *Turkish Perspective* **H.E. Ahmet Bülent Meriç**, Director General for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey
- **US Perspective** David Sobyra, Director, Regional Counter narcotics Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unites States Department of Defense

- **Russian Perspective** Dmitry Balakin, Head of NATO/European Security Section, Department of European Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Discussion

**11:00 – 11:30 Coffee break**

**11:30 – 13:00 Session I Energy Security**

Moderator: Christian Pibitz, Head of Security Management, ErsteGroupBank AG

Speakers:

- Volkan Ediger, Strategy Development & Research Coordinator and Head of Energy Systems Engineering Department, Kadir Has University; Former Energy Advisor to the President of Turkey

- John Roberts, Energy Security Specialist, Platts

- Vladimir Evseev, Director of Public Policy Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences

Discussants:

- Valeryi Chalyi, Deputy Director General, Razumkov Center

- Vladimir Socor, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation

Discussion

**13:00 – 14:15 Lunch**

**14:15 – 16:00 Session II Critical Infrastructure Protection**

Moderator: Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Director, Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University
Speakers:
- Dmitriy Olegovich Reznikov, Senior Researcher, Institute of Mechanical Engineering Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
- Liviu Muresan, Executive President, European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management/ EURISC Foundation
- Mitat Çelikpala, Head, Department of International Relations, Kadir Has University

Discussant:
- Todor Tagarev, Director, Center for Security and Defense Management

Discussion

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee break

16:30 – 18:00 Breakout Session I

Participants will break up into 4 groups lead by rapporteurs and address specific session-related issues

WG 1: Silvia Mitcu, Scientific Researcher, “Alexandru cel Bun” Armed Forces Military Academy of Moldova

WG 2: Tamerlan Mammadov, Director, NATO International School of Azerbaijan

WG 3: George Niculescu, Director of Programs in Brussels, Center for East European and Asian Studies

WG 4: Nika Chitadze, Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, International Black Sea University

18:15 Transport to the Hotel

19:30 – 21:30 Dinner at Hotel
Tuesday, 29 May

30.30 Transport to Kadir Has University

09:00 – 10:00 Opening keynote addresses for the day

Moderator: H.E. Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, Secretary General, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

Keynote Speakers:

- Iulian Fota, Presidential Advisor, Head of the National Security Department, Romanian Presidency “Cooperation and Competition in the Greater Black Sea Area”

- H.E. Feliks Stanevskiy, Head of the Caucasus Department, Institute for CIS Countries “Caucasus in search of peace”

Discussion

10:00 – 10:15 Coffee break

10:15 – 12:00 Session III Transnational Organized Crime

Moderator: David Sobyra, Director, Regional Counternarcotics Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense

Speakers:

- Oğuzhan Ömer Demir, Assistant Professor, International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM), Turkish National Police Academy

- Alexander Gridchin, Assistant Director for International Partnership and Development, Interpol

- Andrew Sullivan, Advising Editor, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project
Discussants:

- **Nigar Göksel**, Editor-in-Chief, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*

- **Sergei Konoplyov**, Program Director, Black Sea Security Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University


Discussion

12:00 – 13:30 Lunch

13:30 – 15:00 Session IV Cyber Security

Moderator: **Craig Nation**, Co-chair of the RSGBSA WG; Director of Eurasian Studies, US Army War College

Speakers:

- **Salih Biçakçı**, Associate professor of International Relations, Isik University

- **Detlef Puhl**, Senior Adviser, Emerging Security Challenges Division, NATO

- **Alexey Salnikov**, Vice-Director, Information Security Institute, Lomonosov Moscow State University

Discussants:

- **Timothy Chafos**, student, U.S. Army War College; served with U.S. Army Cyber Command and the Army Cyberspace Task Force

- **Andriy Shevchenko**, Member of Parliament of Ukraine

- **Sean Costigan**, Lecturer at the New School University; Executive Editor, *Connections*

Discussion

15:00 – 15:30 Coffee break
15:30 – 17:00 Breakout Session II

Participants will break up into 4 groups lead by rapporteurs and address specific session-related issues

WG 1: Gürbüz Bahadir, Director General, Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC)

WG 2: Oğuzhan Başibüyük, Assistant Professor, International Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM), Turkish National Police Academy

WG 3: H.E. Grigol Mgalobishivili, Ambassador of Georgia to NATO

WG 4: Andrey Kulpin, Director’s Adviser for International Cooperation, Institute of Information Security Issues, Lemonosov Moscow State University

17:15 Transportation to the Hotel

19:30 – 21:30 Dinner at hotel

Wednesday, 30 May

08:30 Transport to Kadir Has University

09:00 – 10:30 Looking to the future – critical issues in the Greater Black Sea Area

Moderator: Mihail E. Ionescu, Co-chair of the RSGBSA WG; Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense of Romania

Speakers:

- Mustafa Aydın, Rector, Kadir Has University; President, International Relations Council of Turkey

- F. Stephen Larrabee, Distinguished Chair in European Security, RAND Corporation
- **Dimitrios Triantaphyllou**, Director, Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University

- **Arkady Moshes**, Director, EU Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia Program, Finnish Institute of International Relations

Discussion

**10:30 – 11:00 Coffee break**

**11:00 – 12:30 Session V**

Moderator: **Sinem Akgün Açikmeşe**, Associate professor of International Relations, Kadir Has University

**Presentation** of Recommendations by the rapporteurs of the working Groups

**Discussion** of Recommendations

**12:30 – 13:00 Summing up and Closing Remarks**


- **Mustafa Aydın**, Rector, Kadir Has University; President, International Relations Council of Turkey

- **Mihail E. Ionescu**, Co-chair of the RSGBSA WG; Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense of Romania

- **Craig Nation**, Co-chair of the RSGBSA WG; Director of Eurasian Studies, US Army War College

**13:00 – 14:15 Lunch**

**14:30 Transport to the Hotel**
18:15 Transport to Port
19:00 Bosporus Cruise with Dinner

Thursday, 31 May
Individual Departures
APPENDIX C:
CONCEPT PAPER FOR THE RESEARCH PLAN

1. **Vision**

1.1 The event is organized as a dialogue between practitioners, academic specialists and representatives of civil society with the intention to promote an exchange of ideas and perspectives in an open setting and with a focus on themes relevant to contemporary security challenges in the greater Black Sea region.

1.2 The conference will be based upon the premise of regional ownership and seeks to promote inclusive approaches to regional challenges. It will contribute to the development of a larger network of regional security experts committed to enhancing cooperative security in the Black Sea area.

2. **Organizers**: The Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the PfP Consortium in partnership with the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University, Istanbul; the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard University; and the International Relations Council of Turkey.

3. **Venue**: Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey

4. **Period**: 27-30 May 2012

5. **Topic**: *New Security Challenges in the Black Sea Area: Towards a Cooperative Agenda*
6. Purpose

The conference is devoted to exploring and understanding emerging security dynamics in the Greater Black Sea Area by assessing new security challenges, threats, and sources of risk. The goal is to identify solutions for regional security problems that take into account the interests and priorities of all regional stakeholders and contribute to the emergence of sustainable mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation.

Following the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea area has moved from a stable border region to a focal point of European and international security, a central geopolitical area and point of cultural intersection between East and West. The region is home to several emerging regional powers with vested interests in promoting stability. As a source of and transit corridor for energy resources derived from the Caspian basin, as well as the focus for several volatile local conflicts with larger implications for global security, it has taken on a greater international profile as well. Recent years have witnessed new geopolitical realignments that have redesigned the security architecture in the region and led to the renaissance of engagement and rivalry by external powers. The region has also been plagued by the rise of transnational risks and threats stemming from instability and territorial conflicts as well as organized crime, drug and arms trafficking, migration, and environmental challenges. In view of these threats there is an urgent need to develop new formats for cooperation capable of developing realistic solutions to regional problems and promoting a common regional security culture in the spirit of cooperative security. In the emerging international context, the Black Sea countries need to strengthen their cooperative relations and build coherent strategies to address in a cohesive and coherent manner the wide array of security concerns that confront them.
7. Topic Outline

First panel: *Energy Security*

One of the main objectives of the conference will be to assess the current status of *Energy Security* in the Black Sea region and to draw up a set of recommendations for the development of cooperation in this field. Participants are encouraged to develop approaches to developing sources and routings for energy supplies including dynamics relevant to upstream production and downstream distribution, as well as the energy requirements of regional stakeholders.

*This topic might entail discussion on some of the following subjects:*

- The policy of resource diversification and alternative energy sources: Trans-national projects in the greater Black Sea region
- Pipeline networks: Existing projects and future perspectives
- The role of multilateral cooperation in building energy corridors
- Alternative approaches to energy security: possibilities and policy implications
- Management solutions to energy security: Issues and perspectives
- Beyond the “war of pipelines”: From competitive to co-operative initiatives?
- Energy and security as part of national and international strategies
- The role of the European Union and NATO in promoting energy security
Second panel: **Critical Infrastructure**

Critical Infrastructure describes material assets that are essential for the normal functioning of a society and economy. The conference’s second panel addresses the critical infrastructure aspects of energy security as well as other areas of vital national concern including telecommunications, transportation, water supply, hazardous materials, etc. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) provides the capability needed to eliminate potential vulnerabilities in these areas. Participants are encouraged to discuss differences and commonalities in the CIP strategies of regional actors and to evaluate the adequacy of current approaches. Is it possible to develop a more robust regional strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure in the greater Black Sea area?

*This topic might entail discussion on some of the following subjects:*

- Critical energy infrastructures protection
- National approaches to critical infrastructure in the greater Black Sea area
- Ways to achieve an acceptable level of assurance for critical domains such as transportation, health, banking, environmental protection, embedded systems and networks, civilian air systems, etc.
- Civil emergency (man-made and natural disasters)
- Assessment of vulnerability and planning of capabilities for critical infrastructure protection
- Existing regional/international initiatives on critical infrastructure
- The implementation of a multi-level communication system for exchanging critical infrastructure protection-related ideas, studies and good practices
- Protecting critical energy infrastructure from terrorist activities - the maritime dimension
Third panel: **Cyber Security**

**Cyber Security** is an area where broad international cooperation is essential. Countering the cyber threat requires a comprehensive strategy including intelligence-sharing, defense planning, comprehensive policies and coherent mechanisms able to act in an efficient manner and build viable defense capabilities. During the conference participants are encouraged to focus on analyzing ways and means to enhance the ability to respond to evolving cyber-threats, and on assessing the current stage of cooperation in the cyber security realm.

*This topic might entail discussions on some of the following subjects:*

- Regional cooperation in identifying and combating the threats associated with cyber threats
- What kind of strategies and national policies?
- Regional initiatives and programs to prevent and counter cyber threats
- How can existing cooperation frameworks best be utilized and optimized?
- The need to promote multinational cooperation in the area of cyber security
- NATO’s role in cyber defense cooperation
- The current stage of development of cyber defense capabilities
- The development of new technologies to improve cyber defense situational awareness

Fourth panel: **Transnational Organized Crime**

Transnational Organized Crime is a major security concern within the Black Sea region, and elsewhere. It entails the illegal
trafficking of people, drugs, and weapons under the auspices of transnational criminal organizations. Building viable strategies and national policies to diminish the threat from trafficking requires a forward-looking approach and long-term commitment that is sensitive to the underlying sources of the problem—the plague of organized crime is closely linked to political instability, institutional weakness, corruption, and poverty. The Black Sea region would be well served by the development of a cooperative strategy to address the challenges of criminal trafficking and border management in a constructive and sustainable matter.

This topic might entail discussions on some of the following subjects:

- Combating organized crime: Regional and international initiatives
- National strategies for combating criminal trafficking, arms and nuclear materials smuggling, money laundering, and border management: Generating strategies and implementation planning
- How to develop regional/local partnerships focused on combating organized crime and other related threats?
- Possible models for law-enforcement coordination
- The Black Sea area as a transit route for organized crime networks
- Organized crime as an obstacle to a sustainable regional development
- The role of the European Union in comprehensive strategies to tackle the organized crime issue
- Combating organized crime through existing regional frameworks of regional cooperation
8. Target audience

The target audience will be as inclusive as possible. It should include representatives of governmental agencies and policy makers, defense and security professionals, academic specialists from regional and international institutions involved in defense education and security studies, NGOs, parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, representatives of civil society, and journalists dealing with defense and security issues in the greater Black Sea area. The selection of the participants is intended to facilitate the development of networks of specialists working to enhance regional security cooperation.

9. Working language

The proceedings of the conference will be conducted in English.

10. Funding

10.1 The funding covering all partners’ expenses, as well as the overall costs (rental of the meeting facilities and equipment, transportation, interpreters, meals, etc.) will be provided by the PfP Consortium through the Warsaw Initiative Fund, on the basis of PfP funding procedures.

10.2 The host country might be also asked to provide administrative and logistical assistance as appropriate.

10.3 Participants from NATO countries are asked to attend as self payers. This excludes speakers, moderators and panelists.

11. Submission of research papers

The speakers will be requested to submit a paper version of their presentations to the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group WG’s Secretariat within one month after the end of the conference.
12. Findings

12.1 The findings of the conference will be elaborated in a summary of proceedings including recommendations for regional policy initiatives targeted primarily at stakeholder policy makers.

12.2 The Greater Black Sea Area Working Group and the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University will attempt to prepare an edited volume based upon the conference papers that will make the proceedings available to the broader scholarly community and community of defense academies and security studies institutes.
APENDIX D: SELECTED PHOTOS
NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA AREA